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Intermission

A single sentence, chosen with care, will hang in this light.
— attribution to follow

III

The Thinker

Lamplight, and a question worth keeping.

This room keeps different hours than the desk downstairs. Nothing in here is due by Friday, which is probably why I end up reading more philosophy at 11pm than I do during the actual day.

Most of what gets built downstairs begins as a question up here — usually a small one, held long enough to become load-bearing.

An underlined passage will surface here, the way it did in the book.
source to follow

Papers

  • Metaphysics

    The Shared Explanatory Deficit in Humean Accounts of Causation and Laws

    PHI 497 · Spring 2026

    The question

    Humeans answer two central questions in metaphysics in the same spirit. For David Lewis, neither causation nor the laws of nature involve anything over and above patterns in the world: a cause is an event that another depends on counterfactually, and a law is part of the best systematization of everything that happens. The view is parsimonious, and it may well pick out the right causes and the right laws. The question is whether patterns can do the explaining that science asks of them.

    What I argue

    That they can’t — not in the directed, asymmetric way scientific explanation requires, if explanation is an objective feature of the world. The argument turns on an Independence Principle, which makes explicit what explanatory asymmetry already presupposes: an explanans can’t be fixed by the very facts it explains. A Best System law is determined by a mosaic that includes the trajectory it’s cited to explain, and Lewis grounds causal direction in global thermodynamic patterns that the effect itself helps constitute. Optimizing the system doesn’t help: correctly identifying a pattern is not the same as explaining why it holds. Theoretical distinction does not substitute for independence.

    In conversation with

    • David Lewis
    • Helen Beebee
    • Ned Hall
    • Tim Maudlin
    • James Woodward
    • D. M. Armstrong
    Read the paperPDF, opens in a new tab
  • Epistemology

    A Defense of Externalism Through Regress Avoidance

    PHI 496 · Spring 2025

    The question

    What makes a belief justified? Internalists locate justification inside the believer’s own perspective, and Laurence BonJour’s accessibility internalism goes further: a belief is justified only if the believer can become aware, through reflection alone, of what makes it likely to be true. Externalists let justification depend on factors outside that perspective — above all, the reliability of the process that produced the belief.

    What I argue

    That externalism is the more plausible account, because it escapes a regress that accessibility internalism cannot. My Picnic Planner’s Dilemma follows one ordinary belief — “It is cloudy this morning” — through the reflective justifications internalism demands: that I saw the clouds, that my perception and memory are accurate, that my check on both is reliable, and so on, with no principled place to stop. Basic beliefs would collapse reflective access into mere belief possession; BonJour’s coherentism risks circularity and a web cut off from the world. On Goldman’s reliabilism, justification ends at the reliability of perception, memory, and trusted tools — a psychologically plausible picture of how beliefs actually get formed.

    In conversation with

    • Laurence BonJour
    • Alvin Goldman
    • Andy Clark & David Chalmers
    • Edwin Hutchins
    • Gerd Gigerenzer
    • Daniel Schacter
    Read the paperPDF, opens in a new tab
  • Bioethics

    Convergence Where It Does Not Matter: Procreative Beneficence and the Problem of Well-Being

    PHI 494 · Fall 2026 · First draft, in progress

    The question

    Couples using IVF with preimplantation genetic diagnosis can learn which embryos carry which genes. Julian Savulescu’s Principle of Procreative Beneficence holds that the choice among them isn’t morally neutral: parents have significant moral reason to select the child whose life is expected to go best. But “best” needs a theory of well-being, and hedonism, desire-fulfillment theory, and objective list theory disagree. Savulescu and Kahane reply that the theories converge on which traits make a life go better. The question is whether they converge where it matters.

    What I’m arguing

    That they don’t. The theories agree about conditions like Tay-Sachs, where far weaker principles already tell parents what to do, and diverge on exactly the cases the principle exists to settle: intelligence, temperament, contested disabilities like deafness. Where a selected trait shapes what the child will want, desire theory’s measure of well-being is fixed by the very choice it is meant to evaluate. So the principle faces a dilemma — restricted to the cases where the theories agree, it collapses into disease avoidance; unrestricted, it fails what I call the Guidance Condition. Procreative Beneficence guides parents only where they did not need guidance.

    In conversation with

    • Julian Savulescu
    • Guy Kahane
    • Derek Parfit
    • Alan Holland
    • Elizabeth Barnes
    • Richard Kraut

Recurring themes

  • Technology and ethics
  • Artificial intelligence
  • Beauty, purpose, curiosity
  • Logic, representation, and reasoning

The shelf

The shelf is being stocked.

Questions kept open

How much should I trust a model I can't fully explain?

A few honest paragraphs will live here.

Is it possible to be really good at something without loving it?

A few honest paragraphs will live here.

What do I actually owe the people who end up using something I built?

A few honest paragraphs will live here.

Currently readingto be announced