Metaphysics
The Shared Explanatory Deficit in Humean Accounts of Causation and Laws
PHI 497 · Spring 2026
The question
Humeans answer two central questions in metaphysics in the same spirit. For David Lewis, neither causation nor the laws of nature involve anything over and above patterns in the world: a cause is an event that another depends on counterfactually, and a law is part of the best systematization of everything that happens. The view is parsimonious, and it may well pick out the right causes and the right laws. The question is whether patterns can do the explaining that science asks of them.
What I argue
That they can’t — not in the directed, asymmetric way scientific explanation requires, if explanation is an objective feature of the world. The argument turns on an Independence Principle, which makes explicit what explanatory asymmetry already presupposes: an explanans can’t be fixed by the very facts it explains. A Best System law is determined by a mosaic that includes the trajectory it’s cited to explain, and Lewis grounds causal direction in global thermodynamic patterns that the effect itself helps constitute. Optimizing the system doesn’t help: correctly identifying a pattern is not the same as explaining why it holds. Theoretical distinction does not substitute for independence.
In conversation with
- David Lewis
- Helen Beebee
- Ned Hall
- Tim Maudlin
- James Woodward
- D. M. Armstrong